Note
The foundation of the State of Israel by the Zionists was preceeded and followed by the carrying out of a series of massacres and mass expulsions of the Palestine population, with atrocities and destruction paralled, in modern times, by what the Nazi did against the Jews. The statement that "violence begets violence" seems then perfectly applicable in the case of Nazists and Zionists. And in both cases only the total suppression of their violent projects woud represent the solution to their insane ideas of dominance.
Plan Gimmel (Plan C)
May 1946: Section on Countermeasures
A. The aim of a counterattack is to strike at each source at the beginning of an Arab outbreak in order to deter the instigators of the incidents and to prevent the participation and support of the Arab masses. Forceful and severe blows will serve to identify and isolate the active elements.
B. Because of the difficulty in directly engaging the active Arab forces while they are carrying out their activities, the countermeasures we will adopt will mostly take the form of retaliatory operations. Like all retaliatory operations, they will not always be directed only against the executors of a particular action, but will also be aimed at other active groups or those who provide them with assistance.
C. Counterattacks must be appropriate in kind to the operations which led to the retaliation. These attacks must be as immediate as possible, and must affect large areas. The reasons for the retaliation must be detailed to the Arabs in full, using all available means of communication: leaflets, announcements, radio broadcasts, etc.
D. It is preferable that these operations should strike the Arab rear in order to undermine the Arab sense of security.
E. Counterattacks must be divided into two kinds: warning operations
and strike operations.
Warning operations will come in response to limited or single Arab operations, and their aim will be to warn the Arabs of what may be expected in the future. These operations will mostly be executed in the same area in which the Arabs were active but they must be accompanied by the widest possible media coverage.
The aim of strike operations will be to punish serious operations carried out against us. These strike operations will be more extensive in nature and at the regional or country-wide level, their goal being severe punishment. For example, if they strike one of the Jewish means of transportation by destroying vehicles along with their passengers, the response should be comprehensive and aim at the destruction of all Arab means of transportation.
F. Strikes must be carried out against the following targets:
1. Striking at the political leadership.
2. Striking at agitators, their financial backers, and others.
3. Striking at the executors of operations and those who provide them with shelter.
4. Striking at high-ranking Arab officers and officials.
5. Striking at Arab transportation.
6. Striking at vital economic targets (water installations, flour mills, etc.).
7. Attacks on villages, neighborhoods, and farms used as bases for the Arab armed forces or for their organization, launching, and retreat, etc.
8. Striking at clubs, cafés, meetings, assemblies, and the like.
G. The aim of striking at the political leadership is the following:
1. Doing damage to their property.
2. Imprisoning members in order to hold them hostage or prevent them from performing their activities.
3. Expelling them or physically harming them in some other way.
These operations will be carried out by (Arabist) individuals, or by units the size of a squad or sub-squad which are equipped with light arms and whose line of retreat is as secure as possible.
H. The aim of striking at agitators and financial backers is the following:
1. Doing damage to their property.
2. Doing damage to their printing presses.
3. Harming them physically.
4. Expelling or imprisoning them in certain cases.
These objectives will be realized along the line specified in section G.
I. The aim of striking at the executors of operations and those who shelter them is the following:
1. Expelling them.
2. Doing damage to their property.
3. Imprisoning them in certain cases in order to collect information or hold them hostage. Such operations will be executed by units the size of a squad or sub-squad if the site of the operation is small and close to our bases, and will be executed by units the size of a platoon or larger if the site is far from our bases.
J. High-ranking Arab officers and officials will be targeted as specified in section G, above.
K. The aim of striking at Arab transportation is the following:
1. Carrying out punitive measures against a particular service route or an individual vehicle through sabotage.
2. Striking at services by damaging vehicles and targeting suspected travelers.
3. Destroying the Arab transportation network either wholly or in part.
The operations mentioned in 1 above will be carried out by damaging the service stations along that route, or by sabotaging its vehicles, or by stopping one or more vehicles on the road, evacuating the passengers, and destroying them. The operations mentioned in 2 above will be carried out by setting up ambushes on the road, evacuating passengers, and physically harming the passengers suspected of active assistance against us, and destroying the vehicles. The operation will be executed by about one or two squads. The operations mentioned in 3 above will be executed by carrying out attacks on the service stations and destroying the vehicles. The force needed for such missions is one or two platoons.
L. The aim of operations directed against clubs, cafés, meetings and assemblies, etc. is the following:
1. Dispersal of inflammatory gatherings.
2. Encircling the places mentioned above when they contain known leaders and agitators in order to imprison them or expel them.
3. In some cases, it is necessary to demolish one of the above- mentioned places after evacuating people from it.
The force needed to carry out such operations will be determined by the particular circumstances and will range from a sub-squad to a platoon or more.
M. Striking at Arab economic targets is difficult because of the scarcity of vital projects which, if hit, would paralyze or severely damage the Arab economy. There are few industrial projects and most are of a non-vital nature for the manufacture of tobacco, soap, etc. Striking at such establishments is not always in our interest because it may result in swelling the ranks of the Arab force by scores of unemployed workers. This does not mean that these targets should be removed from consideration, but establishments must be sought which, if hit, would lead to the most effective consequences possible, such as water reservoirs in urban areas, flour mills, the [olive] oil industry, and the like. The importance of strikes against such targets lies in their implementation on a wide scale, whether locally or regionally. Striking at such targets does not require a large force; in most cases a force the size of a squad or sub-squad is enough to mount an operation against a single specific target.
N. The aim of launching attacks against villages, neighborhoods, farms, and hamlets is the following:
1. Kidnapping or expelling leaders and members of gangs and those who assist them.
2. Punishing villages that provide gangs with shelter, by destroying their property.
3. Attacking villages where an armed Arab force is located.
For the execution of operations mentioned in 1 above, see Section I above.
For the execution of operations mentioned in 2 above, the village will be surrounded by a force whose size will vary with the circumference of the village and the resistance expected from it (the size of the force will range from a platoon to a company). A part of this force—at least half—will enter the village and carry out acts of sabotage by setting fire to and blowing up targets. If the objective is general punitive action, everything possible should be set on fire and the houses of the instigators and participants in operations must be demolished.
As for the operations in 3 above, they will implemented according to the principles relating to attacks on an entrenched hostile force.
O. Most operations should be carried out under cover of darkness because of the difficulty of movement [in the daytime]. In addition, due consideration should be given to returning men and equipment to their bases.
P. In order to implement the countermeasures detailed in this chapter in an effective manner, active and extensive intelligence and reconnaissance networks must be set up and the Arabist units must be developed.
Q. Propaganda will have a large effect on the extent to which incidents are publicized and on the deterrent value this will have on the Arab masses.
Therefore, an extensive propaganda network must be organized by the following means:
1. Radio.
2. Leaflets.
3. Whispering campaigns diffused by Arabs or Arabists.
Each of our countermeasures should be widely publicized and reverberate in every Arab village.
Plan Dalet (Plan D)
10 March 1948: General Section
1. Introduction
(a) The objective of this plan is to gain control of the areas of the Hebrew state and defend its borders. It also aims at gaining control of the areas of Jewish settlement and concentration which are located outside the borders [of the Hebrew state] against regular, semi-regular, and small forces operating from bases outside or inside the state.
(b) This plan is based on three previous plans:
1. Plan B, September 1945.
2. The May 1946 Plan Gimmel or Plan C
3. Yehoshua Plan, 1948., an early version of Plan D
(c) Since these plans were designed to deal with the situation inside the country (the first two plans deal with the first phase of incidents, while the third plan deals with the possibility of invasion by regular armies from the neighboring countries), the aim of Plan D is to fill the gaps in the previous three plans and to make them more suitable for the situation expected to obtain at the end of British rule in the country.
2. Basic Assumptions
This plan is based on the following basic assumptions:
(a) The Enemy
1. Expected composition of forces:
— The semi-regular forces of the Liberation Army affiliated with the Arab League, which operate from already occupied bases or bases to be occupied in the future.
— The regular forces of neighboring countries, which will launch an invasion across the borders, or will operate from bases inside the country (the Arab Legion).
— Smal local forces which operate, or will operate, from bases inside the country and within the borders of the Hebrew state.
All three forces will be activated at the same time in accordance with a joint operational plan and will sometimes engage in tactical coordination.
2. Actual operations expected from the enemy:
— Isolation and, if possible, occupation of the eastern Galilee, western Galilee, and the Negev.
— Infiltration into the heart of the area of Sharon and Emek Hefer in the direction of Qalqiliyyah-Herzliya and Tulkarm-Netanya, roughly.
— Isolation of the three major cities (especially Tel Aviv).
— Disruption of food supply lines and other vital services such as water, electricity, etc.
3. Expected tactical methods:
— Attacks by the regular and semi-regular forces on settlements, using heavy infantry weapons, as well as field artillery, armored vehicles, and the air force.
— Air strikes against centers within our cities (especially Tel Aviv).
— Harassment operations carried out by small forces against transportation arteries and settlements to give the operations mentioned above direct or tactical support. These forces will also carry out sabotage operations against vital economic facilities and terrorist raids within cities.
(b) The Authorities
This plan rests on the general assumption that during its implementation, the forces of the [British] authorities will not be present in the country.
In the event that British forces continue to control certain bases and areas, the plan must be modified to deal with this situation in these areas.
Additional instructions will be issued in this regard.
(c) International Forces
This plan rests on the assumption that there will be no international forces stationed in the country which are capable of effective action.
(d) Operational Objectives
1. Self-defense against invasion by regular or semi-regular forces. This will be achieved by the following:
— A fixed defensive system to preserve our settlements, vital economic projects, and property, which will enable us to provide governmental services within the borders of the state (based on defending the regions of the state on the one hand, and on blocking the main access routes from enemy territory to the territory of the state, on the other).
— Launching pre-planned counter-attacks on enemy bases and supply lines in the heart of his territory, whether within the borders of the country [Palestine] or in neighboring countries.
2. Ensuring freedom of military and economic activity within the borders of the [Hebrew] state and in Jewish settlements outside its borders by occupying and controlling important high-ground positions on a number of transportation arteries.
3. Preventing the enemy from using frontline positions within his territory which can easily be used for launching attacks. This will be effected by occupying and controlling them.
4. Applying economic pressure on the enemy by besieging some of his cities in order to force him to abandon some of his activities in certain areas of the country.
5. Restricting the capability of the enemy by carrying out limited operations: occupation and control of certain of his bases in rural and urban areas within the borders of the state.
6. Controlling government services and property within the borders of the state and ensuring the supply of essential public services in an effective manner.
3. Assignment of Duties
In view of the operational objectives outlined above, the various armed services are assigned the following duties:
(1) Strengthening the fixed defensive system designed to defend the zones, and coordinating its deployment on the regional level. In addition, the main enemy access routes to the lands of the state must be blocked through appropriate operations and measures.
(2) Consolidation of the defensive apparatus.
(3) Deployment in major cities.
(4) Control of the main transportation arteries country-wide.
(5) Encirclement of enemy cities.
(6) Occupation and control of frontline enemy positions.
(7) Counterattacks inside and outside the borders of the country.
(a) The Fixed Defensive System
1. The fixed defensive system in rural areas depends on two main factors: using protected areas for the purpose of defending the circumference, on the one hand, and blocking main transportation routes used by the enemy, on the other hand.
2. The security arrangements pertaining to the zones in rural areas, which were originally designed to repel small enemy forces, must be modified in terms of planning and reinforcement to suit the tactical measures expected to be employed by semi-regular or regular enemy forces.
This will be effected according to instructions issued by the operations branch in charge of defense and planning in rural areas.
3. In addition, if we take into consideration the tactical measures expected to be employed by the enemy, efforts must be made to make a transition from a positional defense to a regional defense, so that the unit of defense is the region and not the zone.
4. In order to achieve this objective, the following steps must be taken:
a) Transformation of the regional staff from an administrative staff to a general staff (selection of a location, setting up a communications network, etc.)
b) Formation of a regional mobile reserve, to be recruited from the forces appointed to the zones, which would reinforce the forces or carry out counterstrikes in the zones within each region according to pre-arranged plans.
c) Adaptation and incorporation of the plans concerning fortification and opening fire in the zones to those of the region, as far as possible, taking into consideration geographical circumstances and types of weapons used. These plans must also be coordinated with the operations of the regional mobile reserves.
5. Settlements which because of their geographical location cannot be included in a fixed regional defense plan must be organized into local defense zones. Accordingly, they must be equipped to block transport roads used by the enemy, or if tactical circumstances permit, to control the heights, setting up fortifications and barricades and laying mines, etc. This will be done in addition to activating the zone's defensive apparatus.
Additional forces must be assigned to carry out these duties, as will be detailed below. These specifications also apply to isolated regions.
6. Blocking the main enemy transportation routes.
a) The main enemy transportation routes which link his lands to the lands of the state, such as roads, bridges, main passes, important crossroads, paths, etc. must be blocked by means of: acts of sabotage, explosions, series of barricades, mine fields, as well as by controlling the elevations near roads and taking up positions there.
b) A system of barricades must be set up in addition to the fixed defensive system. The tactical plans concerning barricades must be adapted to and coordinated with the defensive plans concerning the zones located near these barricades. They must also be coordinated with the regional defense plans if this is possible from the geographical point of view.
(b) Consolidation of Defense Systems and Barricades
The following operations must be carried out if the fixed defensive system is to be effective and if the rear of this system is to be protected:
1. Occupation of police stations.
2. Control of government installations and provision of services in each and every region.
3. Protection of secondary transportation arteries.
4. Mounting operations against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force. These operations can be divided into the following categories:
— Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.
— Mounting combing and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search inside it. In the event of resistance, the armed force must be wiped out and the population must be expelled outside the borders of the state.
The villages which are emptied in the manner described above must be included in the fixed defensive system and must be fortified as necessary.
In the absence of resistance, garrison troops will enter the village and take up positions in it or in locations which enable complete tactical control. The officer in command of the unit will confiscate all weapons, wireless devices, and motor vehicles in the village. In addition, he will detain all politically suspect individuals. After consultation with the [Jewish] political authorities, bodies will be appointed consisting of people from the village to administer the internal affairs of the village. In every region, a [Jewish] person will be appointed to be responsible for arranging the political and administrative affairs of all [Arab] villages and population centers which are occupied within that region.
(c) Deployment in Major Cities
Positions will be taken in the large cities according to the following principles:
1. Occupation and control of government facilities and property (post offices, telephone exchanges, railroad stations, police stations, harbors, etc.)
2. Protection of all vital public services and installations.
3. Occupation and control of all isolated Arab neighborhoods located between our municipal center and the Arab municipal center, especially those neighborhoods which control the city's exit and entry roads. These neighborhoods will be controlled according to the guidelines set for combing villages. In case of resistance, the population will be expelled to the area of the Arab municipal center.
4. Encirclement of the central Arab municipal area and its isolation from external transportation routes, as well as the termination of its vital services (water, electricity, fuel, etc.), as far as possible.
(d) Control of Main Transportation Arteries on the Regional Level
1. Occupation and control of locations which overlook main regional transportation arteries, such as police stations, water pumps, etc.
These elevated locations will be transformed into fortified surveillance posts to be used, when the need arises, as bases for a mobile defensive force.
(In many cases, this operation will be coordinated with the occupation of police stations, which aims at consolidating the fixed defensive system.)
2. Occupation and control of Arab villages which constitute a serious obstruction on any of the main transportation arteries. Operations against these villages will be carried out according to the specifications given under the item pertaining to the combing of villages.
(e) Enemy Cities Will Be Besieged according to the Following Guidelines:
1. By isolating them from transportation arteries by laying mines, blowing up bridges, and a system of fixed ambushes.
2. If necessary, by occupying high points which overlook transportation arteries leading to enemy cities, and the fortification of our units in these positions.
3. By disrupting vital services, such as electricity, water, and fuel, or by using economic resources available to us or by sabotage.
4. By launching a naval operation against the cities that can receive supplies by sea, in order to destroy the vessels carrying the provisions, as well as by carrying out acts of sabotage against harbor facilities.
(f) Occupation and Control of Frontline Enemy Positions
Generally, the aim of this plan is not an operation of occupation outside the borders of the Hebrew state. However, concerning enemy bases lying directly close to the borders which may be used as springboards for infiltration into the territory of the state, these must be temporarily occupied and combed according to the above guidelines, and they must then be incorporated into our defensive system until operations cease.
Bases located in enemy territory which are intended to be temporarily occupied and controlled will be listed among the operational targets for the various brigades.
(g) Counterattacks Inside and Outside the Borders of the State
Counterattacks will be used as auxilliary measures for the fixed defensive system in order to abort the organized attacks launched by semi-regular and regular enemy forces, whether from bases inside the country or from outside the borders.
Counterattacks will be launched according to the following guidelines:
1. Diversionary attacks; i.e., while the enemy is launching an attack against one of our areas, [our forces will launch] a counterattack deep inside another area controlled by the enemy with the aim of diverting his forces in the direction of the counterattack.
2. Striking at transportation and supply routes deep inside enemy territory, especially against a regular enemy force which is invading from across the border.
3. Attacking enemy bases in his rear, both inside the country [Palestine] and across its borders.
4. Counterattacks will generally proceed as follows: a force the size of a battalion, on average, will carry out a deep infiltration and will launch concentrated attacks against population centers and enemy bases with the aim of destroying them along with the enemy force positioned there; alternatively, this force may split up to carry out secondary operations, such as acts of sabotage and diversion on the enemy's military transportation routes and arteries.
5. A detailed list of counterattacks will be included in the [list of] operational targets of the Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH = short for Plugot Machats: crushing battalion].
4. Duties of the Armed Services
(a) Allocation of duties in the fixed defensive system:
1. The following duties are the responsibility of the Garrison Force
[KHIM is short for Khayl Matzav, the second line troops. By fall 1947, they numbered about 32,000]: defense of the zones and of isolated and fortified posts and formation of the regional reserves.
2. Within the framework of the fixed defensive system, the Field Force [KHISH is short for Khayl Sadeh, the front-line troops. By 1 May 1948, they numbered about 30,000] are responsible for the following duties:
Operations to block enemy transportation routes. For this purpose, every blocking operation will be assigned, on the basis of its importance and type, a specified Field Force unit whose size is appropriate to the nature of the mission.
— In addition, the Field Force brigade in question will be responsible for duties related to consolidating the fixed defensive system, as outlined in section 3 (b).
3. In special and exceptional circumstances, Field Force units may be positioned in the regions or zones, or in isolated and fortified positions, in order to reinforce zonal or regional defense. Efforts must be made to decrease the number of such cases, as far as possible.
4. In addition to the duties detailed above, the Field Force's responsibilities in the context of the fixed defensive system generally consist in mounting local counterattacks involving units no smaller than a company (larger units should be used if possible) against enemy units while they are attacking the fixed defensive system in order to block their lines of retreat and destroy them. These counterattacks will usually be launched from fixed operational bases which will be specified for the Field Force in the context of the duties for which it is responsible in the region as a whole.
These instructions require that the Field Force units be concentrated as much as possible, and not be divided up into secondary units.
5. The chain of command in the cases mentioned above will be in accordance with Addendum 1 to the Order concerning Regional Infrastructure, November 1947.
6. In circumstances in which the blocking system (which the Field Force is responsible for defending) is incorporated into the zonal or regional defensive system, the commander of the Field Force battalion concerned will appoint the commander in charge of the entire defensive system.
(b) 1. In addition to the duties assigned to the Field Force brigade in question concerning the consolidation of the fixed defensive system, the brigade will also carry out the following duties:
— Consolidation of positions in the cities.
— Control of main transportation arteries country-wide.
— Encirclement of enemy cities.
— Occupation and control of enemy frontline positions. This will be effected in accordance with the operational duties assigned to the various Field Force brigades. *
In order to carry out one or all of these duties, the supreme command can assign units of the Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH], which constitute the country-wide reserves, to the Field Force.
2. During the implementation of joint missions with the Field Force, units of the Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH] will fall under the command of the Field Force brigade that controls the area in which these units are operating.
3. After completion of the mission, the units of the Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH] will rejoin the country-wide reserves.
4. Efforts must be made to ensure that the period during which units of the country-wide reserves are assigned to the Field Force is as short as possible.
(c) 1. The Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH] is responsible for carrying out counterattacks inside and outside the borders of the country.
2. The supreme command may reduce the number of duties assigned to one or another of the Field Force brigades as it sees fit (i.e. those related to the siege of enemy cities, control of transportation routes and occupation of frontline positions) and allocate them directly to the Strategic Mobile Force [PALMACH] instead.
(d) The various departments and services of the general staff are required to complete the above planning instructions in their various areas of responsibility and to present the plans to the Field Force brigades.