Solneman
(Kurt H. Zube)

An Anarchist Manifesto
The Manifesto of Peace and Freedom
The Alternative to the Communist Manifesto

(1977)

 



7. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EQUAL FREEDOM OF ALL

 

Equal Freedom of All as Regards Land

Equal Freedom of All in the Exchange of the Products of Labour

The "Sovereign Functions " of the State

Autonomous Protective and Social Communities

New Formulation of Human Rights

Open Productive Associations (OPA Enterprises)

 


 

It has been a long way, fraught with errors, from "liberties" to freedom. The "liberties" that were, again and again, confused with freedom, whether they were given or taken, were, at best, incomplete parts of freedom, of full and complete freedom, and were as a rule only crass contrasts with real freedom. For when such "liberties" were granted it was done by those who reserved for themselves a greater degree of freedom at the expense of the others, and they claimed this as their unquestionable privilege (based on some pre-given "right"). And when "liberties" were withdrawn, they were either only such incomplete parts of the freedom of the oppressed or they were even those "liberties" of the oppressors which amounted to the authority to limit the equal freedom of others, i.e. real freedom, the equal freedom of all.

Thus it was a milestone in the history of social science, one that has not yet been duly honoured, when John Henry Mackay made clear, for the first time, with all its consequences, that there is no real condition of freedom as long as anyone enjoys an excess of freedom at the expense and against the will of anybody else!

Herbert Spencer has also spoken of the equal freedom of all, though without drawing the necessary conclusions from it.

Karl-Hermann Flach declared (Die Zeit,10th November 1972) that liberalism means "freedom and dignity for the greatest possible number" (not for all!). He went on to say: "Freedom of the individual finds its limits in the freedom of other individuals, of neighbours. Freedom is thus incomplete without a high degree of equality, at least of equal starting opportunity. Beyond that, freedom means a certain measure of order, since anarchy in the end always establishes the right of the strongest." The last sentence reverses the facts, since anarchy is precisely the very opposite to a condition in which the law of the jungle prevails.

Milton Friedman also praises the equal right to freedom as "important and fundamental, since human beings are all different and the one does something different with his freedom than the other and may thus contribute more to the general development of a society in which many people are living." By this he means that "freedom" which the above-quoted Anatole France joked about, and Milton Friedman received the Nobel Prize for his advice to use the monetary monopoly for a permanent annual inflation of 5%.

The principle of the equal freedom of all begins with the individual human being (not with the abstraction of "man," about which there are so many delusions) and with provable examples from experienced reality. These specific human beings are very different from each other, according to aptitudes and talents, abilities and performances. Whoever, like Flach, wants to balance the highly different physical and mental capacities which men bring with them from their birth (and which one must accept as facts) by measures which are directed against others as demands and "claims" (there is nothing to be said against voluntary services for the benefit of disadvantaged people), gives equality precedence over freedom (apart from the practical impossibility of realizing such an endeavour) and cannot argue for this other than ideologically, let alone justify it. Non-ideological equality at the starting point is given when people - as nature or "God" created them - are altered to develop without being artificially hindered in this, e.g. by any prerogatives, privileges, monopolies or oligopolies established or claimed by others, i.e. unhindered by domination, by forcefully restricted freedom.

The absolute freedom of action of each individual is limited firstly by his natural capacities and abilities, but also by the result of his accomplishments. (For the utilization of the latter, a market free from domination is the indispensable prerequisite and it does not exclude any other form of utilization.) Whoever performs better than another and therefore owns more money, for example, also has more freedom of action than the other. The principle of the equal freedom of all presupposes these natural differences between individuals and is based on them. It does not want to balance them out by any measure (unless through voluntary arrangements), since that would result in some equality and not in the equal freedom of all. Whoever, for example, has musical talent or is an artist, has more freedom in the absolute sense to arrange and enjoy his life than the non-musical man or non-artist has. But this, his extra freedom, just as with the man who is a better performer, does not occur at the expense of others! It does not restrict the equal freedom of others to use equal or similar gifts.

The concept of so-called "inner freedom" plays a part too. It is often praised as "true" freedom, existing in spite of the restrictions placed on external freedom. A person who suffers from inhibitions due to disturbance in his development, for example, is as restricted in his absolute ability to act as someone else who is obsessed by prejudices or fixed ideas and cannot free himself from them.

Quite independently of highly diverse "inner freedom" and of the natural capacities and abilities of individuals, which are also very different and not measurable in the absence of a standard, the principle of the equal freedom of all is confined to the exactly measurable external freedom of individuals in their relations with one another. For here, as we have seen, there can only be the choice between aggressive force and agreement - considering the absence of any provable pre-given "rights" and "duties" or other guidelines. The decision to come to an agreement is, in the long run, possible only on the basis of the equal freedom of all.

This means for everyone: not to be coerced by the will of another, be it that of an individual or a group, either to do or to neglect anything except one thing, namely to renounce for oneself and mutually any attempt to force one's own will upon others aggressively. This means especially that the external freedom sphere of anyone is never smaller than that of anybody else (except when and as long as he voluntarily consents to this), and that there is no excess of freedom for some at the expense and against the will of others. It also means, among other things, the absence of any monopoly or oligopoly and of any precedence or privilege for an individual or a group. For this would be, for the person concerned, an excess of freedom at the expense of all others.

N.B. Not greater freedom of action by itself, but only the restriction or taking away of the equal freedom of another against his will, goes beyond the limit of the equal freedom of all and is an aggression against this person.

Thus if someone voluntarily limits his own freedom of action in favour of another person and grants him a privilege or monopoly towards himself, then we have no infringement of the equal freedom of all.

One must be aware that much of what is considered conventional morality or necessary laws results automatically from the principle of the equal freedom of all. The murderer and killer, for example, presumes a greater freedom of action for himself and at the expense of the victim whom he deprives of his life and thus limits the victim's freedom of action in the most radical way. The robber, thief and swindler similarly act against the will and at the expense of the freedom of their victims by depriving them of their property. All these are clearly aggressive acts which offend the equal freedom of all and lead to indemnification claims.

Thus the equal freedom of all means: mutual freedom from aggressive intervention willed by another; self-determination within the framework of this mutuality; and the inviolability of the non-aggressive individual. Within a condition of the equal freedom of all, no one can give orders to anyone unless the one ordered about first authorizes the commander. Force is permissible only insofar as it serves as a defence against aggressive intervention. Laws as well as customs and habits which limit a person's sphere of freedom against his will, in favour of excessive freedom for others, are nothing but aggressive force.

Since freedom means absence of aggressive force or of violence and since the dividing line between aggression and defence is drawn by the equal freedom of all, and since conflicts arise only by such invasions against the will of the person concerned, one may also establish the principle of the avoidance of aggressive force instead of that of equal freedom.

The equal freedom of all or the prohibition of aggressive force therefore means individual freedom from all institutionalized compulsion - with one exception: in order to uphold respect for the equal freedom of all others and, naturally, also for the observance of all obligations voluntarily undertaken towards others.

In any relationship with others one must not draw the wrong conclusion from the rather reasonable (but incomplete) principle: "Do not do unto others what you do not want done to yourself." Some people conclude from this that we should do unto others what we would have them do unto us. "Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same as yours."

Therefore, the equal freedom of all begins with the enormous variety among individuals according to talents, abilities, and performances in their thoughts, feelings, desires and wills. It rejects any schematizing and grants all these varieties the greatest possible opportunity for realization - up to the point where the individual or group would extend their own freedom sphere at the expense of others and, for this purpose, want to limit the equal sphere of freedom of the others. Only in this sense is freedom to be equal. Otherwise, it will be different in particulars. Especially any attempt by individuals or groups to obtain excessive freedom for themselves as the expense of others surreptitiously, by hiding their very personal claims behind the pretended ones of collectives and abstractions, or behind religious, moral and ideological articles of faith, will be exposed as veiled aggression. Sensible questioning of the provability of the claims raised will expose these attempts as aggressive force.

No group will then be conceded a prerogative towards any individual nor, conversely, will any individual be granted any prerogative towards any group. Either would amount to ideology. In this context, one must note the fact that all groupings are composed of specific individuals who differ considerably. There is no uniform thinking, no uniform will in a group as such - apart from the temporary appearances of mass madness and induced insanity, behind which, however, individuals are always hiding who clearly act as initiators.

Neither "God" nor "the State" nor "Society" make aggressive demands but, again and again, there are always merely individuals or whole groups of individuals who conceal themselves behind these notions and ascribe their own thinking and wants to them.

Everything that remains within the bounds of voluntary arrangements - like an authorization given to a surgeon to interfere with one's physical inviolability or a promise to obey the commander of a voluntary militia - rests within the framework of the equal freedom of all, even when in the process - for a while and to some extent - the sphere of action of the authorized person is larger than that of the one giving his approval.

However, it should be clear that one may only limit one's own freedom by a contract in favour of another person but never the freedom of another against his will. Consequently, State actions which violate the equal freedom of all are merely law of the jungle and aggressive force, labeled as "right" when they have the approval of a majority but not of the minority concerned - even if this minority consists only of one individual. One has indeed become so used to thinking differently on this matter or, better, one has been manipulated to become used to this notion - but that is no reason for retaining the predominant conceptual confusion. Orwell's "1984" is close and the power of "Big Brother" relies precisely on confused concepts and on those concepts which have been turned into their opposites.

Everywhere that "equal freedom" is spoken of here, one must by no means think of it merely in the narrowest sense as freedom of movement and free play. Instead, as already mentioned, it is a question of freedom in every respect from any forceful intervention by the will of others that goes beyond the mutual balancing limit.

Not only a demand which aims to disadvantage the person concerned but even one that aims at his alleged interest, his protection and his welfare, without being requested by him or against his will (i.e. both types of demand), must be recognized as aggression even when this claim is backed up by the assertion that the person concerned is not able properly to realize his own interest. Such tutelage - particularly when it is based on the allegedly higher intelligence of the aggressor or upon his allegedly higher racial value, for example - remains an unprovable ideological demand and an offence against the equal freedom of all, since the attacked person could just as easily demand that the aggressor share the victim's judgment on what is suitable for the victim.

With every specific claim that is raised by one man against another, one can at any time objectively determine whether it is based on a provable right which relies upon voluntary arrangements or upon an alleged "right" in whose existence he merely believes, but which he cannot prove and whose violent realization is thus aggression, whenever, in doing so, the limit of the equal freedom of all is infringed. In the same way, one can clearly determine, in every case, whether in a condition that exists (or is aimed at) one person possesses an excess of freedom of action, a monopoly or privilege, at the expense and against the will of another.

EQUAL FREEDOM OF ALL AS REGARDS LAND (^)

To illustrate, one may conceive the freedom spheres of individuals as spreading from everyone in concentric circles in such a way that they finally touch each other and, thereby, form a border. At the same time this clarifies the fact that the equal freedom of all is no absolute concept but a relative one: the more numerous individuals are the smaller does their space for free play relatively become. This can be observed particularly in the area of limited available natural resources.

If, for example, ten shipwrecked people were stranded on an uninhabited island of 500,000 square metres, then they could divide this among themselves (assuming the land to be of equal quality) into 50,000 square metres each for any use that did no harm to the environment or to other people. With 100 islanders, however, there would only be 5,000 square metres remaining for each person.

The equal freedom of all includes, in principle, the equal claim (not "right") of every individual to the whole Earth - and not only to that section of the earth where he was born, which has become a State territory as a rule by conquest, annexation or murder. The Earth's surface (including rivers, lakes and oceans) with its natural resources, as the primary and basic prerequisite for every human existence, and indispensable for food, shelter and a working place, is available only in limited quantity, and the quality of the land, as well as its site, also play an important part.

Property in land, and especially property that exceeds the possibilities for personal cultivation and use by the owner, was possible at most at a time when the civilized areas of the Earth were less densely populated and the population growth was much lower than today. But even then, when in large areas of the Earth there was still land that could be freely used and cultivated, it was nevertheless unreasonable for those who possessed land "property" in civilized districts and in preferred sites to an extent which went far beyond their chances to cultivate or otherwise use it personally, to demand that all other people, in order not to disturb them in their comfort, should leave them their oligopoly and pay them the corresponding tributes or, alternatively, leave the country.

Nowadays, when there is hardly any free land left anywhere in the world and, generally and fundamentally, every claim to a privilege, monopoly or oligopoly offends the principle of the equal freedom of all, and its defence constitutes an aggressive action aimed at the maintenance of unequal freedom, private (as well as nationalized) property in land has become as absurd, for example, as property in air.

This applies not only to such land property as goes beyond the possibilities of personal use and cultivation and which, therefore, by its exclusion and exploitation function, amounts to a monopoly good that extorts more and more income, and so also a growing superiority in capital, in capital concentration in market domination.

Land and natural resources are means of production and capital, but means of production and capital that are given by nature which need not - as with produced means of production - be worked for.

Thus everybody has an equal claim to use land, and no one has a privilege over it that can be substantiated.

Thus, if anybody prevents the use of this gift of nature or makes it dependent on the payment of any tribute (rent or charge) which means unearned income for him - and this based on an alleged property "right" that can be founded on nothing other than aggressive force and infringement of the equal freedom of all - then he is claiming a privilege that cannot be justified and is committing an aggressive act - even if some law "legalizes" it. And even a person who uses land only to a limited extent, for personal use, as a dwelling or working place, must understand that he cannot do this free of charge (for this would be a claim to a privilege). Instead, he must pay compensation to the totality of all others who might raise an equal claim to the piece of land concerned. Conversely, he himself, as part of this whole society, may share in what all others (wanting to use a piece of land) have to pay as compensation to the whole society.

"Property" in land means, among other things, that all who are born later are fundamentally disadvantaged, since, due to increasing demand, pieces of land become more and more expensive and "owners" are also less and less willing to sell. In any case, it means the "right" to exclude all others from the use of the piece of land concerned, although they are absolutely dependent upon such land, at least as a place to live and work, while they may raise exactly the same claim to its use as the "proprietor."

"Property" in land means especially the "right" to extort tribute and unearned income from others, based upon a claimed but unjustifiable privilege.

The achievement of equal freedom for all in land and natural resources requires the equal access for everyone to land and everyone's equal share in the use of this means of production, but at the same time excludes any privilege, monopoly and oligopoly of individuals, groups or institutions over land and its resources.

For this purpose today's land "owners" need only be stripped of their privilege or oligopoly, but they need not be deprived of the value of their (genuine) possessions. They could continue to utilize them economically, within the new framework, with rights completely equal to those of all others.

This means, of course, no nationalization of land - which amounts only to the replacement of many oligopolists and privileged people by one single monopolist. Moreover, it is precisely the State that protects and maintains "property" in land, as well as other monopolies, oligopolies and privileges.

Here one must also be conscious of the fact that State functionaries by no means represent the interests of all citizens equally. Instead, they are primarily functionaries of domination over all subjects. Moreover, seeing that State functionaries are controlled by economic and political lobbies, outside of the State, they one-sidedly represent the interests of some against the interests of others, at the expense of others.

It is, rather, a question of "socialization" in the sense that access to land and its resources is opened up for everybody under equal conditions and that every individual member of "society" receives his share in the "natural monopoly good" land, within the framework of the equal freedom of all.

This could, for instance, happen in the following way (unless a still better solution were to be found). All urban and rural land could be leased to the highest bidder for a certain period (approximately one year for market gardens and rural land, and approximately five years for urban and industrial land).

The returns are to be equally distributed according to the number of people involved, regardless of whether they are men, women or children (including leaseholders). As far as possible, this should be carried out on a world-wide scale, thus compensating for different land values, as every human being can raise a claim on the whole Earth, within the framework of the equal freedom of all.

In order to prevent people from being disadvantaged in this lease procedure due to their different financial positions, and in order to assure unconditionally that everyone has access to land as a means of production, those people who merely want to utilize a small piece of land (up to approximately 1,500 square metres per head) to secure food and accommodation for themselves and their family without outside labour, should have priority in this leasing procedure, insofar as, first of all, they should compete only among themselves. Only afterwards, when their demand has been satisfied, are others who are interested in leases to be considered, especially those others with a bigger purse. Since those without property should be given a respite for the payment of their rent until the next harvest, and since the per-head share of everyone in the total rent income (due to the high land values of urban land) may lie far above the rent of those using minimum blocks of land, those requiring little land in practice receive the right to use it free of charge.

In this context, one must know also that 1,500 square metres are sufficient to cover the total food requirements for one person, with a quite minor labour of only eight weeks per year, spread over the seasons.

Now, once everyone can in this way be independent and can assure his food and accommodation requirements, while at the same time obtaining a small rent from the per-head share of the members of his family (to the extent that this exceeds the rent that he owes for his small block, a rent that will be correspondingly larger with those who do not claim agricultural land), then, by this alone, unemployment will become as good as impossible.

But many of today's other problems would then also solve themselves. This solution to the land question would mean, especially, the most effective development aid which is possible, since through it individuals in the developing countries would benefit directly from equal access to land (from which most of them are excluded today), as well as from their equal share in the rent proceeds from the industrialized countries with high land values.

Moreover, there will be no more exploitation through the chance possession of natural resources and raw materials that constitute monopolies or oligopolies.

Rents would then gradually reach that amount which a piece of land yields in its function as a means of production and capital beyond a normal return for labour (i.e. what one today calls land rent). (An exception would be rents for certain, especially preferred pieces of land in whose increased rent value everyone would share anyhow). Nobody has an interest in offering more, apart from the exceptional cases hinted at. And competition will prevent a lower offer. Thus, seen from this aspect too, this is the "most just" solution.

"It is self-evident that increases in the value of the rented land, e.g. through soil-improvement or new buildings, are to be paid for by the succeeding lessee and that, conversely, the lessee is also liable for land damages caused by him."

Only when in this way everyone learns to conceive of the whole Earth as his personal sphere of interest, without any privileges and with equal rights for all, will an effective protection of the environment become possible. For this, again, the equal freedom of all is the only useful standard. Here one will have to begin with the question: what would the consequences be if all people claimed that privilege to pollute and poison the environment which today is claimed by a minority (which is even protected and promoted by the State), with the assertion that the damage thus caused to the environment and to fellow human beings was still bearable and within reasonable limits.

Under a world-wide per-head distribution of total rent income, everyone would directly feel the effect of an increase in world population by a decrease of his share. This would also create a very effective counterbalance to population increase, which today often happens without consideration or sense of responsibility.

The share per person for everyone from the land rent (in the double sense) secures even a certain compensation for those naturally disadvantaged. Their physical defects, illnesses or lesser mental gifts cannot provide them with any "moral" claim for compensation which would be obligatory for others, but they do have a claim arising from the equal freedom of all. Moreover, as was already mentioned, the equal freedom of all is no final and absolute principle, but is relative and changes with environment and population. Its concrete development may change considerably in the course of time, with progressing knowledge of experienced reality and with progressing technology. The principle will remain the same, but its application will change. One could, for example, conceive of the world population shrinking to about half or less of what it is at present and being able then to achieve almost paradise-like conditions with developed technology and under conditions of non-domination.

Thus the above outlined proposal for a solution to the fundamentally important land question could certainly be very much improved, although not in its principle but in individual cases in the course of time and with changing circumstances.

The proposal does, at any rate, establish for individuals, who are legally incapacitated and in so many ways oppressed by the State, at least more or less those conditions under which free-living animals exist in nature. Nature offers them for free and in sufficient quantity all that is necessary for their existence. To claim land and natural resources as "property," to buy and sell them, is possible only with the same "right" as one could also buy or sell air and sunlight, demanding as the "owner" of these gifts continuous tribute from others for the use of them.

In contrast to this, there is an inescapable alternative. Either one acquires such a "right" through aggressive force (which is also the case if one lets this "right" be "protected" by aggressive force), whereby one openly admits to being an adherent of the law of the jungle; or, alternatively, one has to come to an agreement with all other human beings about access to land and to the use of this gift of nature, and thus arrived at a genuinely rightful solution. This however, is only possible on a basis of strictly equal rights and when there are absolutely no privileges left.

It is only if one keeps in mind the fact that even in the densely populated German Federal Republic there are approximately 4,000 square metres per head (on a global scale there are even 25,000 sq. metres per head) and also that, according to "democratic" principles, each individual should have a claim to a corresponding portion of the land surface of his fatherland, that it becomes quite clear in what an impudent manner the great mass of the people have been robbed of this main basis of their existence and what a role the alleged protector and promoter, the State, plays in this robbery.

Of course, all land and natural resources presently owned by the State must be subjected to the new ruling by which every human being, without exception, is guaranteed access to a vital minimum of land and is also assured an equal share in the rental of the total surface of the Earth and of all natural resources. A more detailed explanation of the land question and a discussion of objections to the suggested solution may be found in K.H.Z. Solneman's Diskussionsergebnisse (Results of a Discussion), Freiburg /Br., 1976.

 

EQUAL FREEDOM OF ALL IN THE EXCHANGE OF THE PRODUCTS OF LABOUR (^)

The money monopoly and credit oligopoly have even greater consequences than the oligopoly of land property. Here the State monopolizes the issue of exchange media (money) by transferring it to a central note-issuing bank, which thus obtains the "right" to issue bank notes (which are, in reality, debt certificates!) as legal tender, and instead of paying interest, it demands interest payments for these. Moreover, this interest lies far above the cost of the production and administration of this means of exchange. Thus, we have here, in the first place, a typically monopolistic exploitation through exclusion of competition, and this directly emanates from the State. However, this has far-reaching results, which multiply the exploitation effect in favour of a minority of privileged people and oligopolists .

Furthermore, the State manipulates the business of banks, which can to a limited extent create so-called book money (out of nothing), for which they charge the monopoly interest of the central note-issuing bank besides their own interest charges. In this way - for example through the German Federal regulation that every new bank must have a minimum capital of 6 million DM - only a privileged circle can benefit from the advantages of this oligopoly.

While with the land oligopoly, unearned income, though exploitative, is still held within certain limits, due to competition between a relatively high number of oligopolists, and while it directly raises only the price of produce, living and working space, and natural resources, the effect of the money monopoly and credit oligopoly reaches much further, since to the price of all goods is added, as a rule, a far higher charge than that directly or indirectly due to land rent. The result is that, on the average, approximately 50% of the price of all goods flows into the pockets of monopolists and oligopolists as unearned income, while with rents included this often amounts to as much as 75% to 80%.

Since the price of land depends on its value as "capital" and since this value increases with each rise in the interest rate, the land-rent, too, is very considerably influenced by the level of the interest rate.

Even if there were an abundance of land offered, the land rent could not fall below the artificially maintained high monopoly interest rate.

One has to realize that monopoly interest is not identical with the discount or lombard rate of the central bank, but that it is at least double, if not three times, its rate. And this simply because the central bank does not issue the means of exchange, "money," directly to any individual or any firm, but exclusively to the privileged banks. Due to this privilege, these banks can add to their already excessive discount and lombard rates not only their own costs and a moderate profit rate, but also an excessive profit, which reached record heights during the most recent recession. That is the kind of "freedom" which is represented by the present "rightful" order.

Compared with this, under real freedom, without domination, i.e. under the equal freedom of all, which does not know any monopolies, oligopolies, or privileges, means of exchange, which could also take forms other than the usual money of today, would be available very cheaply, i.e. for no more than 1% to 2%, including a premium for credit risks. (Consult on this also the Swiss example in K. H. Z. Solneman's Drei Kernforderungen zur Vermoegensverteilung - Three Essential Demands for the Distribution of Wealth - Freiburg, Br., 1974.)

There already exist quite a number of concrete proposals how, after the abolition of the money monopoly (against which a true storm of anger will be raised once people begin to reflect upon its effects), the costs of money administration, "interest," could be reduced to 1% to 2% (including the premium for credit risks) by means of money issues under free competition, e.g. by transport enterprises or shopping centres, though by banks, too, of course. At the same time, stable money can be established, i.e. a truly lasting currency - something that all note-issuing State banks have not achieved in spite of their (allegedly) greatest efforts.

Apart from that, everyone would be free to continue using the money issued by the previous exclusive note-issuing banks - as long as others were still willing to accept it. All central banks might attempt to continue working as before. They will only have to forego their monopoly and face free competition, and will not be able to compel acceptance of their currency as "legal tender" among those who do not want to belong to the corresponding legal and social community.

Financial specialists are already expecting great changes in payment methods. Cash (apart from small change) may become superfluous, as well as today's cheque payments and bank transfers. In a computerized and cashless clearing system, an identity card resembling a credit card will be put into an automated machine in all pay offices. This machine will debit the customer's accounts in favour of the seller's and will, if the customer is short of funds, reject the identification card, as vending machines reject forged coins.

Even better than this procedure, and far superior to the present payment system, is a quite new and yet very simple payment and credit system that offers debtors and creditors hitherto unusual advantages - among them, outstandingly cheap credit, even under the present conditions. There are in the field of finance surprising solutions, which can rival the most astonishing achievements of technology and natural science.

It is most important that through the simple measure of repealing the money monopoly and the credit monopoly, the function of the extortionist monopoly interest rate should be abolished as a barrier, for again and again it stops productivity and production in general and keeps them far beneath technical possibilities and demand. In the same way, there will be an end to the continually repeated destruction of the capital of small savers through inflation. This has kept them in permanent dependence upon the monopolists and oligopolists and exposed them to exploitation by them. For without compulsory acceptance of a means of exchange falsified by inflation, and against free competition, their issuers could not exist. Furthermore, after the legal protection for such fraudulent acts is withdrawn, these issuers would naturally be criminally prosecuted in any social order based on non-domination.

Any child can grasp what the inevitable consequences are when, through the money monopoly and credit oligopoly (and also the land oligopoly), huge amounts of increased income are continually flowing into the pockets of a minority - after being withdrawn from a majority which thus becomes permanently dependent on that minority. All the unpleasant effects arise which one has called "capitalism" without being aware of its real essence: domination - in numerous forms - of some over others, instead of the equal freedom of all.

 

THE "SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS" OF THE STATE (^)

A more honest expression for "sovereign functions" is the monopoly of force which the State claims (i.e. has taken) by means of the law of the jungle. Who has set the State its alleged "functions" (tasks)? Certainly not the so-called elected representatives of the people. They are dependent upon their parties and the men behind them. There is already sufficient evidence available on the selection of these "representatives of the people" and their conduct even towards their own voters. The "State," however, already existed long before the representatives and has confined their activities through its constitution and numerous laws to a relatively narrow field. The "State" is a largely anonymous power. Behind it, numerous political and economic powers hide. These oppose each other and agree only in their unconditional claim to rule. In twisted ways and behind the scenes, they control parliament as well as the State functionaries. The "peoples' democracies" are more honest here when they declare: "The party controls the State." But for what purpose does it command? Certainly not in the interest or even for the protection of the equal freedom of all who live within its sphere of power.

The Western democracies proceed from the assumption (which can be proven to be false) that the State protects the interests of its compulsory members equally. Yet it is quite plain that through numerous privileges, monopolies and oligopolies it represents, first and foremost, the interests of a minority against a majority and that its functionaries have developed into an exploiting class of its own, which hardly ranks behind the capitalist class in importance and methods. The "freedom" which the State promises to guarantee stands in blatant opposition to real freedom, the equal freedom of all, whose most dangerous and fundamental enemy is the State - all the more so since it understands how to convince the majority (through extensive manipulation) that any State activity is, without a doubt, useful and necessary.

Max Weber wrote (in Politik als Beruf - Politics as a Profession - Collected Political Writings):

"Violence is, naturally, not the normal or only means of the State - that is not claimed here. However, violence is characteristic of the State. ... Today ... we must say: The State is that human community which, within a certain territory . . . successfully claims for itself the monopoly for legitimate force. For what is characteristic today is that all other communities or individual persons are allowed the right to resort to physical force only insofar as the State permits them to do so. The State is considered the exclusive source of the right to use force …."

There is no reasonable justification for the majority principle in a compulsory community either. A majority can neither claim any privilege over a minority nor reduce the sphere of freedom of any individuals, against their will, to less than the limits of the equal freedom of all - except by means of the law of the jungle, of aggressive force.

Just as the State establishes the oligopoly of landed proprietors over the equal rights claim to the use of the land not only of all the other citizens in a particular State but also of all human beings everywhere, so too it assumes super- proprietorship in "its State territory" and exercises domination over all people and all values existing there. State territories were established just as property in land was - as a rule by robbery, conquest and murder. The privileges which the States usurped in these territories, and the additional ones they grant to and "defend" for favoured individuals and groups, are aggressive acts, based on nothing other than the law of the jungle, even when they are labeled "right" by means of elaborate ideological "justifications."

A fundamental solution to the land question according to the principle of the equal freedom of all (especially if it were connected with the abolition of the money monopoly and credit oligopoly) would make quite unnecessary most of what today is considered to be a State function. There would no longer be any rivalries between "State territories," or borders to be defended, as soon as every human being, without exception, has guaranteed the same claim to the use of the Earth. Likewise, there would no longer be any "economic policy" with import quotas, tariffs, dumping and subsidies which are taken by force out of other people's pockets. There would be no more unemployment or emergencies caused by men where there would not be sufficient voluntary helpers, who already come forward today in cases of natural misfortunes.

With the abolition of all privileges, monopolies and oligopolies (those favouring the State itself, as well as those granted by the State in favour of the privileged), the State must quit its role of master and become a servant. It must e.g. limit itself to a strictly non-aggressive and purely defensive role. It may only offer its services in free competition with other (voluntary) associations, when it is called upon. It may no longer, like a gangster, press any not requested "protection" or "care" upon the people, especially not for a one-sidedly fixed and forcefully collected "fee."

 

AUTONOMOUS PROTECTIVE AND SOCIAL COMMUNITIES (^)

The State will have to abandon its monopoly claim on aggressive force (as every other adherent of the law of the jungle will have to do in the future) and will have to dissolve itself, or rather, be dissolved into those organizations on a strictly voluntary basis, which was sketched by de Puydt.

De Puydt has already tacitly assumed that each of these autonomous protective and social communities ("Autonome Rechts und Sozialgemeinschaften") would voluntarily, in its constitution, so to speak, renounce the use of aggressive force, internally as well as externally, i.e. not infringe the equal freedom of all. With this, the common framework is provided for a genuine (since it rests on voluntary agreement) and rightful order to replace hitherto existing State law. Moreover, mutual interest is born in a common defence against any aggressors, whether they are individuals, groups or States of the previous type, against any adherent of the law of the jungle and aggressive violator.

What De Puydt overlooked, or at least did not clearly describe, is the fact that the necessary precondition for such an order is the equal freedom of all towards land and its resources, as well as the abolition of all other privileges, monopolies and oligopolies - both in the relationship of the autonomous protective and social communities as such among themselves (in contrast to the previous conduct of States against each other) and in the relationship of the members of one such autonomous protective and social community towards the members of all others - and also towards those who do not want to be members of any of them. This means that in spite of the considerable legal differences which would apply only to the relations of the members of one particular autonomous protective and social community among themselves, all disputes with outsiders could be regulated according to the uniform principle of the equal freedom of all.

In spite of - or, rather, because of - this principle (since the voluntary self- restriction of a person's own freedom really remains within its framework), the legal situation within particular autonomous protective and social communities will be extremely varied. Unlike States, these communities are not territorially separated from each other. The members of each of them are associated only through voluntarily accepted legal and social responsibilities - which are, naturally, accompanied by corresponding rights - while they live and work either dispersed or next to each other, as the members of various religious communities do nowadays.

As already mentioned, this settlement offers "to everyone the State of his dreams." There will be autonomous protective and social communities which will place an emperor at their head, others a king, and again others a president. Without infringing the principle of the equal freedom of all, they will formulate their laws correspondingly. No one but their own voluntary members will have to pay for this.

The members of an autonomous protective and social community could even elect a dictator for themselves (but not for anyone else), for their freedom also includes the freedom to become voluntary slaves. Naturally, they could also withdraw from this condition by leaving after a prearranged notice period.

Catholics could adapt their autonomous protective and social community to their church law and to any decision by the Pope. For instance, they could "punish" among themselves not only abortion but also any contraception. (Generally, sinners could not avoid any agreed upon "punishments" if their "crime" fell into the period before their withdrawal became effective.) Apart from this, they could practice the Christian concept of "love they neighbour " not only towards themselves, but also towards outsiders, as long as these did not expressly object to it.

Communists could then run enterprises collectively according to the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." They could do this with land and enterprises of every kind that were collectively leased by individual members of their autonomous protective and social community or by groups within it. They could also combine their per head shares in the total returns from lease rents for any collective use.

Without detriment to such differences among the autonomous protective and social communities, their task then lies primarily in the prevention of aggression against the equal freedom of all, as represented for instance by murder, manslaughter, assault, robbery, theft, fraud, rape etc. In this, autonomous protective and social communities - through competition - will proceed more sensibly than States, which, in their prosecutions, neglect the interests of the victims and, for example, not only do not provide for indemnification but even make it impossible by paying for labour done during imprisonment for less than its actual values.

Autonomous protective and social communities could undertake, for their own members, the supervision and control of the lease of land and the distribution of the returns from these leases, while non-members could unite in a special association for this purpose.

The establishment of principles of "right", similar to today's civil rights and those in commercial law, is yet another task for autonomous protective and social communities, for cases in which arrangements between contracting parties are incomplete.

Other functions are the protection of contracts and jurisdiction among members, as well as arbitration in cases where one of their members gets into a conflict with a member of another autonomous protective and social community. In this case, the other person is, of course, represented by his protective community in an arbitration court.

In these cases, an international court, comprising representatives from the particular autonomous protective and social communities, can then form a reconciliation court and court of last appeal, in order gradually to solve problems arising from vastly different legal systems. Such problems can only be rare exceptions when in all these autonomous protective and social communities the principle of the equal freedom of all is applied. Where this is not the case, the community concerned has to be dealt with by the other communities in the same way as an individual aggressor would be.

As long as there are still States of the present type left, or as long as the danger still persists that some autonomous protective and social community will reapply principles like the domination and protection racket of today's States, we must expect that, in the constitutions of at least some of the better communities, a part will be played by a militia or a professional army for purely defensive purposes.

Internally, i.e. not only among the members of a particular protective community but also for their protection against open aggression by individual members of other protective communities, a police force will, of course, be necessary. However, unlike today, this police force will have to limit itself strictly to defence when subduing attacks against the limit of the equal freedom of all. Consequently, this police force can hardly ever come into conflict with the police of that protective community to which the aggressor belongs. If this should nevertheless happen, an independent arbitration court must decide on the rights and wrongs of the matter. It lies in the essence of the principle of the equal freedom of all that neither an individual nor a group (i.e. no particular protective community) may arbitrarily and one-sidedly pass judgment on the case as long as one opposing party contradicts. The arbitration court solution is the alternative to a resort to aggressive force. The constitutions of all autonomous protective and social communities will also oblige their individual members to recognize arbitration decisions.

The international arbitration court can and will play a very important part in the protection of the environment. An intelligent solution to world-wide environmental problems will generally be possible only when they are dealt with in accordance with the equal freedom of all. States make only empty promises in this respect, since they do not represent the interests of all individuals but only of their favoured groups, in addition to their own power interests and financial interests.

Finally, measures of social protection and care are among the tasks of the autonomous protective and social communities, depending on whether the members want to cover their costs by levying taxes or prefer to realize this protection by means of private insurance arrangements. Both methods may exist side by side.

They could range, for example, from full coverage for hospital and medical expenses and pensions of the most varied types (both paid for by contributions, though perhaps including financing from tax funds) to the communist system in which the members of the autonomous protective and social community concerned would produce according to their capabilities for one common account which is to be used by each member according to his needs.

The individual autonomous protective and social communities will be in lively competition with each other, according to the taxes they demand from their members and the advantages they offer them. There will be some in which the members have further claims against the community, perhaps because they prefer to insure themselves against emergencies and thus prefer communities with lower taxes. There will be others desiring comprehensive "care" in the form of a Welfare State, and these people will then have to pay correspondingly higher taxes or contributions. Whether the taxes or contributions are low or high, in relation to the services offered, is, of course, relative.

Whoever is not satisfied with the entitlements and performances of the autonomous protective and social community that he has joined, will just change over to another one. Since each community will endeavor to win over as many members as possible, as taxpayers, he will have a sufficient choice. And nobody will any longer be forced to remain constantly under the tutelage of others - which always easily leads to mismanagement and corruption.

Autonomous protective and social communities will also solve, in the simplest way, the problems of previously oppressed minorities, since they will grant them full equality within the framework of the equal freedom of all and so the form of organization which they want.

 

NEW FORMULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (^)

Basically, there is only one human right upon which all can and will agree (with the exception of aggressive violators and of open adherents of the law of the big fist): the equal freedom of all.

And this equal freedom of all, as a genuine right, based on mutuality and agreement and not on one-sided dictation, must also be recognized and realized quite clearly, as a claim of every individual, without exception, who does not exclude himself from this claim by proclaiming the law of the big fist. Thus this human right has little in common with previous declarations of human rights, which were proclaimed as not binding, or were "granted" by States which limit the rights granted in the first sentence by the second one or which expressed them so vaguely that they could be arbitrarily interpreted and which, above all, do not offer an individual any possibility of suing for "human rights" before a court.

From previously formulated "human rights" those must also be excluded which, in their consequences, represent an offence against the equal freedom of all or at least could be understood as such. This does not exclude the possibility that they might nevertheless be accepted into the constitutions of some autonomous protective and social communities, since the voluntary limitation of one's own freedom is possible at all times.

Of course, one may compose a catalogue of all those particular liberties which represent a special aspect of the equal freedom of all and which, summed up, result in it. This catalogue would constantly need to be supplemented, since the principle must be applied in ever new situations due to changes in technology and environment. It must include, especially, the following particular liberties as basic rights.

Here one should mention beforehand that if one or the other of the particular liberties is excluded in some of the autonomous protective and social communities, either by their constitution or by internal laws, then this applies, of course, only to the equal freedom of all. This principle draws a borderline only against the forceful subjugation of one's own will by another and does not exclude the voluntary limitation of one's own freedom in favour of others. In this way, for instance, internal obligations for members of an autonomous protective and social community may also be determined by majority decisions. However, nothing may prevent the minority which does not agree with such a referendum decision from withdrawing from the community, after due notice while retaining all previously acquired rights against the community concerned. The most important of the particular liberties are as follows.

In the first place, freedom of thought and freedom to express thoughts in words, in writing and in pictures. It finds its limit, e.g. where, by wrongful accusations, it harms the reputation and penetrates the sphere of equal freedom of others, or where it appeals for aggressive restrictions on the equal freedom of all.

Complete intellectual independence pre-supposes also economic independence. As the English historian Belloc put it: "The control over the production of goods is control over human life altogether." Yet even without the total control as desired by State socialism and State communism, and without the nearly total control exercised by the capitalistic economy of monopolies and corporations - the smallest economic privilege, monopoly or oligopoly granted to an individual, a group or an institution, limits the equal freedom of all. Thus all privileges, monopolies and oligopolies must be abolished, especially those creating unearned income by enslaving the workers. For freedom in one's work is the basis for economic independence. Free and equal access to land as a factor of production is as important here as access to capital as a factor of production. The latter is already largely assured by the freedom to exchange the products of one's work, without which freedom in one's work is valueless. Apart from the abolition of the money monopoly, this means freedom of credit and also the liberation of trade from all barriers, creating unlimited free competition which has so far never existed (which does not exclude the internal restriction of competition within some autonomous protective and social communities).

Further important particular liberties are: freedom to associate for any non-aggressive purpose (i.e. one respecting the equal freedom of all) and also freedom to dissolve voluntarily entered obligations, whereby, of course, contractual stipulations, e.g. withdrawal periods, are to be observed. Further, freedom to learn and teach in forms determined only by supply and demand; freedom of faith and conscience, to believe or not believe; freedom of love in all its forms; freedom of physical and health care, as well as of nourishment and clothing; freedom also to neglect one's body. To the freedom of choosing for oneself the medical doctor or healer one trusts, belongs the freedom to exercise the healing profession - and any other! - a right of everyone who feels called to do so and is capable of doing so. Naturally, in case of culpable harm done to a patient, the healer concerned is liable to pay damages as a certified doctor is today in such a case. Also freedom for art and science must finally be re-established without limitations. Nowadays this freedom in most cases exists only on paper, while it is restricted by regulations for admittance, practice, taxation and "promotion."

Even the denial of only one of these particular liberties, no matter for what reason, means the fundamental denial of all others! For, whenever and with whatever reasoning and "right" of guardianship is demanded and realized, a "right" to excessive freedom to determine and act at the expense of the corresponding limited freedom of other people to decide and act - then, with the same or similar "justification", one could realize the "right" to use aggressive force in every other respect also. For such "rights" - like all those not based on voluntarily concluded contracts - cannot be proven to exist in fact and are thus nothing other than disguises for brute force.

The most popular among such "reasoning" are: protection and care of a person who allegedly does not recognize his "true interests." Of course, it does often happen that one is mistaken in what one considers useful and suitable for oneself. But the "protector" and "caretaker" may err at least as often. So when a person does not want to listen to good advice, he will be taught by experience. However, if someone presumes (even though one cannot at all identify with the quite different circumstances of life, the experiences and the thinking and feelings of other people) to be able to judge better than another what is suitable for him and denies him his judgment and self-determination, leading him forcefully "upon the right path" instead of merely giving non-obligatory advice, then that someone is an aggressor, even if he is acting with "the best intentions." He himself would certainly strongly protest if someone were to doubt his capacity for judgment and forced him to do something contrary to his understanding and his will. It is obvious that here the equal freedom of all is trespassed against. Apart from that, when someone is forced "in his own best interest" by someone else, then the first usually denies that the other has the ability to judge. Thus one person merely stands against another, and it is quite manifest who interferes in the sphere of the other.

But due to manipulation, one has become so used to the whole phraseology of "rights" and "duties" which allegedly are "superior," and so used generally to numerous "higher spheres," as well as to aggression especially by the State (in their time, the claims of the princes "by divine right" were hardly doubted either), that today not even striking cases of such aggression are noticed by most people, even when their negative effects are manifest. This is especially the case when these seem also to have a positive aspect, although closer examination would prove this to be an error or at least that it is by far outweighed by the negative aspects. Everywhere that the State - allegedly in everybody's interest - makes activities (for example, those of teachers doctors, and healers) dependent upon its examinations and its regulations, it exercises a tutelage that is as impermissible as it is superfluous.

Nothing could be said against the State merely certifying a certain quality (as will be done also by autonomous protective and social communities) if it did not hinder the activities of persons who were not examined for this purpose. If someone cannot present such a certificate, which could also be acquired from other sources, then his clients will realize that they are risking something by accepting his services.

The effect of State tutelage, for instance in health matters, is shown by the fantastic expenditure of thousands of millions (which, moreover, are forcefully taken out of the pockets of the persons "cared for") in relation to partly scandalous conditions in hospitals and other health insurance services.

As already explained in the chapter on the State (Chapter 2), the State, with its compulsory schooling, does not at all promote the interests of the children, as it pretends to do, but primarily its own interests - by forming obedient subjects and by teaching them things which are, above all, useful to itself, as Dr. Walther Borgius has shown in his description of the historical development of schooling (Die Schule - ein Frevel an der Jugend - The School - A Crime against Youth! - Berlin, 1930). Not even the few licensed private schools (which are, however, subject by State regulations to the general curriculum) break the State monopoly that must be removed from this field. For since they have to bear the cost themselves, while the cost of public schools is taken from general tax revenues, parents who send their children to private schools have to pay twice for schooling, and only a few are able to do this. On the other hand, the ingenious Japanese Obara has given an example how free schools - with a disproportionately higher learning success - can finance themselves. Dr. Gustav Grossmann too (for instance in Ferner Liefen - Others also Ran - Munich, 1963), as well as other writers, proved that pupils are often seriously harmed by the public school system, while with modern learning methods they could learn more in half or even only a quarter of the presently usual period (the record lies in one ninth, i.e. in one instead of in nine years). Thus, State schools mean an enormous waste of time and money, while their results are revealed by the educational misery in the German Federal Republic today.

The hint at the costs involved in the two above-mentioned examples also answers the fear that the majority of autonomous protective and social communities, which would replace the State, would bring about still higher costs than the State does. Apart from the fact that e.g. the German Federal Republic provides ten State governments and State parliaments besides the federal government and the federal parliament, competition between autonomous protective and social communities and, above all, the right to secede of the merely voluntary and no longer compulsory members, will assure that they must compete with each other in the interests of a rationalized and money-saving administration, so that in the long run only those will be successful which provide the best services at the lowest prices. In this way one will also avoid that cancerous growth of the bureaucracy which happens according to Parkinson's Law and which only serves the power and special interests of the State itself and of its functionaries but not the interests of all those coercively embraced and regimented by it.

 

OPEN PRODUCTIVE ASSOCIATIONS (OPA ENTERPRISES) (^)

The abolition of all legal monopolies and oligopolies is not by itself sufficient to establish the equal freedom of all, at least not as long as the enormous differences in property exist which arose through the previous privileges and monopolies. Thus it needs to be supplemented by a measure which on the one hand will eliminate all actual monopolies and oligopolies, and on the other will make it possible for all people without a fortune to invest their labour power rationally and competitively, i.e. based on corresponding capital. At the same time, the development of new monopolies must be prevented. For besides "natural" monopoly goods (as represented by land itself and especially by natural resources, like coal, oil, natural gas, minerals, etc.) and apart from the privileges and monopolies created by the State through legislation, there are still enterprises which - mostly by exploiting the existing system of privileges and monopolies - have grown to a size that dominates the market, as do especially large corporations, trusts and giant enterprises. Such market super-powers can largely eliminate weaker competitors, exploit the purchaser through excessive prices, and ensure themselves of a monopoly rent - by means of which the enterprises become more and more powerful. Also, for example, railways, power stations and telephone networks have a certain monopoly character by their particular nature, as well as by being already firmly established, which also impedes competition. Even in a social order without domination, the rise of a market super-power, due to especially favourable circumstances or by the characteristics of the enterprise concerned is not impossible.

Judging by past experience, there is no anti-trust legislation, no "socialization" and no "co-determination" as previously conceived that is effective against the "natural monopolies" created by natural resources and against those which gradually arise due to the size of enterprises or to their characteristics.

Under the present co-determination system, instead of the "capitalists" (or beside them) the employees' of the monopoly enterprises concerned can make use of their positional strength to ensure for themselves monopoly incomes at the expense of all others - through excessive wages. It already happens today that particular trade unions (e.g. in essential industries, but also in small groups of specialists, like air controllers, power plant workers or garbage men), while engaged in the quite justified endeavor of increasing their working incomes, do not do so at the expense of interest, land rent and the actual, not only alleged, monopoly profits of entrepreneurs. Instead, they secure income advantages for themselves by means of the power of their organization or their key positions, regardless of the working people in other employment, and this at the expense of those other workers and of all consumers, since the wage increases do not affect interest and land rent or the profit of enterprises but simply increase prices.

Now, there exists a means hardly discussed so far, a means that is as simple as it is effective, for avoiding the dangers spreading from such monopoly enterprises and achieving at the same time another, equally important goal: free access to the means of production for every person willing to work.

How this can happen for land in what is probably the optimum way, has already been outlined. But for rational land cultivation and use, capital is required too. Under today's conditions, this is refused to those who possess nothing but their capacity to work and is available to others only against high interest. This applies all the more to industrial, professional, commercial and crafts activities, and to nearly all other kinds of activities, too.

Marx quite correctly realized that he who owns nothing but his working strength depends on the person who possesses the means of production and thus may be exploited by him. But since he overlooked the role of the State as a creator and defender of privileges and monopolies (by which it became possible in the first place to keep persons willing to work from getting access to the means of production and which made their dependence on these proprietors possible), he wanted to turn the goat into a gardener and the State into a super-monopolist. He overlooked the possibility which was much closer at hand: of removing the State itself together with all the privileges and monopolies established and maintained by it. Nor did he see the possibility of rendering natural monopolies harmless, and harmless too the monopolistic or market-dominating character of some enterprises due to their size or special features. A new kind of enterprise and industrial organization for this purpose was proposed in principle by Theodor Hertzka in his work Freiland (Freeland), Dresden and Leipzig, 1889.

According to this principle, all enterprises with a monopoly character - and beyond them as many others as possible - are to be transformed into the property of "open workers' associations" (open cooperatives), which constitute something between a private and a public enterprise. How this transformation may take place with compensation to the previous owners, in some cases even with their continuing cooperation and profit-sharing, will be discussed in detail in the chapter following the next.

It is characteristic of these "open" enterprises that, in principle, they must remain open to every person willing to work in them. Exempted from this are only people absolutely unsuited for the work concerned. Thus such "open" enterprises must accept all people wishing to be employed by them, if necessary by correspondingly shortening the working time, regardless of whether the members already employed agree or not.

By this the following is achieved, among other things: when a monopoly gain is obtained in such an enterprise the above-average labour earnings attract new workers until the wages have settled down around the average level. Then a further influx will cease automatically, since nobody is interested in working in a place where he earns less than he could, on the average, in other enterprises. As large a number of such enterprises as possible would, moreover, besides providing free access to land for everyone, be an additional guarantee to make unemployment impossible in future. It is an absolutely insane condition that today there are many millions unemployed in many countries, who have to be supported by others, while they are prevented from creating values by their own work, which would increase the total production of goods and would maintain them and relieve the others of the burden of supporting them. Furthermore, they would create more income for the others by exerting a demand with their own income and thus making additional sales possible for the others.

Hertzka mentions certain pre-requisites for the functioning of this system of open productive co-operatives. Among them one must mention the openness of all business proceedings, including the publishing of gross earnings, expenditures, net gains, purchases and sales, labour services, and the use of net profits. According to the type of these data, they should be published between once a year and once a week (e.g. for labour investments and labour gains). Then individuals could easily inform themselves where the investment of their labour would be most profitable for them.

Hertzka suggested the following "model constitution" for such an Open Productive Association (OPA):

1. Everyone may freely join any OPA, no matter whether or not he is at the same time a member of another OPA. Likewise, anyone can leave any association at any time (naturally, only after observing the usual term of notice). The management decides about the employment of the co-operators.

2. Every member has a claim to a portion of the net gain of the OPA that corresponds to his labour service.

3. The work performance of each member is calculated according to his working hours, with the stipulation that older members are granted an additional amount for each additional year they have been members of the group, compared with those who joined later. Likewise, an additional amount for qualified work can be stipulated by free contracts.

4. The work performance of the managers or directors is to be equated, by means of individually concluded free contracts, with a certain number of daily working hours.

5. The total earnings of the association are calculated at the end of each production year and are then distributed, after the capital repayments have been deducted. (Hertzka still speaks of an approximately 30% deduction for the "community." From these funds old-age and social service pensions are to be covered, but also interest-free loans are to be granted by a central bank to the OPAs. Naturally, autonomous productive and social communities could levy such social and tax contributions from their voluntary members. However, such variations have nothing in common with the principle elaborated here). In the meantime, the members receive advances amounting to 'x' percent of the net earnings of the preceding year for every hour of work done or credited.

6. In case of the dissolution or liquidation of the association, the members are responsible for debts in proportion to their share in the profits. This liability applies also to new members. The liability of a member for already-contracted debts does not expire when the member leaves the association. This liability for debts has its counterpart in the claim of the liable member against the remaining property in case of liquidation.

7. The highest organ of the association is the general assembly, in which every member (who need not be an actual co-worker) exercises the same active and passive right to vote. The general assembly makes its decisions with a simple majority of votes. For constitutional changes and liquidation of the enterprise, a 75% majority vote is required.

8. The general assembly exercises its right either directly as such or through its chosen functionaries, who remain responsible to it.

9. The business of the association is conducted by a board of directors, who are elected by the general assembly and whose authority is revocable at any time. The subordinate functionaries of the managing board are appointed by the directors. However, the income of these functionaries - measured in working hours - is decided by the general assembly, upon proposals by the directorate.

10. The general assembly annually elects an internal auditor, who has to check the books as well as the conduct of the managing directors and has to report on this periodically.

The preceding principles need commentary, especially the seeming paradox in point one. There the entry into any association depends on an individual's free will, but his employment within the association is made dependent on the judgment of the board of directors, which would thus decide in what way and whether the offered labour power is really to be used. The reason for this is quite understandable. No unauthorized and incapable person should disturb either other people's work or the organizational connections which are to be regulated by the directors. However, the board of directors may only judge the ability of those reporting for work. It may not be guided by considerations on whether the association really needs new people. Instead, it must employ any able person in a manner corresponding to his abilities, and this by a uniform reduction of working time - regardless of whether the previous collaborators desire this or not.

The right of everyone to join any such association (regardless of the work that he does in it) offers a guarantee that the decisions of the board of directors will really be made in this sense. For even if no one in any association could work without the approval of the management, everyone registered as a member can vote in the general assembly, and the managing directors are elected by the general assembly and are replaceable by it at any time. The exercise of the disciplinary power granted to them is thus subject not only to the continuous control of the actual workers of an association but to public opinion. Thus they will certainly not commit an intentional injustice as long as they want to keep their positions. When there are differences of opinion on the abilities of candidates, then tests, and, if necessary, arbitration courts, will decide.

Conversely, this right of co-determination can hardly be abused (by means of artificial majorities) to force the management to employ unsuitable intruders. For their employment would reduce the profitability of the enterprise, and an excess of co-operators would reduce the profit share of each individual member, that of those newly joined also, so that every co-operator is interested in avoiding this. It would be more likely that a desire for a monopoly gain would induce the current staff to collaborate with the directors in blocking new admissions. But this negative effect is not to be feared since it is limited by the right of everyone to join as a member and vote in the general assemblies.

Transformation into OPA's is, however, necessary not only for all present monopoly enterprises and all those which in future grow into a monopoly or achieve market domination. Instead, the establishment of such OP As must be effected to the greatest possible extent, in order to assure the equal freedom of all in one of its most important preconditions. It must become possible, on principle and for everyone, not only in respect of land, to take up, alone or in association with others, an independent occupation, i.e. one not dependent on wages, and this fully supplied with all necessary means of production for such an activity. The chapter after the next will show the ways leading to such a goal.

 


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