Note
This interesting point elaborated by the author in this writing is the fact that he sees the Palestinian problem as something that the inhabitants of the region (Arabs and Jews) must sort out to reciprocal benefit. On the contrary, if it becomes an international question with the meddling of other States and their political interests, no acceptable solution might ever be found out. And this is what has happened so far.
The proposal put forward by Buber is the establishment of a bi-national commonwealth where everyone is treated equally and all the different styles of life are respected and preserved. Unfortunately, the cosmopolitan Jews living in Palestine have become the Ultranationalist Zionists and, in their turn, have perpetuated, against the Palestinians, the criminal atrocities that other Jews had suffered in the past at the hands of the Nazis and their allies.
So, it is quite appropriate to remind the George Santayana statement that "those who don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it." And in this case with the most appalling and atrocious consequences.
When some years ago, a group of Jews from Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine combined their efforts in founding the IHUD (Union) Association, and later created the monthly BA’AYOTH as its organ, the main problem occupying their minds was the one usually referred to as the Arab question. This problem consists in the relationship between Jewish settlement in Palestine and Arab life, or, as it may be termed, the intra-national basis of Jewish settlement. The intra-national approach is one which starts out from the concrete relationship between neighbouring and inter-dependent nations, when considering the given economic and political facts and when considering decisions within their domain; the international view, on the other hand, gives predominance to the necessarily more abstract relations between civilised nations as entities. It is one of the most important characteristics of our revolutionary age that intra-national considerations are gaining in significance, when compared with international ones. As long as the traditional colonial policy, the “legitimate” rule over the destinies of remote peoples, was indisputedly maintained, the intra-national point of view was denied its natural precedence. With the growth of self-confidence in the nations and with their increasing desire for self-determination, concrete geographical conditions became absolutely and relatively more important factors. Especially was this the case where historical connections existed and where new possibilities were opened up for the joint erection of a new cultural and social structure. This accounts for the fact that international politics soon became the scene of a dispute between the colonial point of view and considerations of neighbourliness. It may be assumed that this state of affairs will only suffer a radical change in the course of a future stage of global development, when the actual and all-embracing co-operation between the nations, brought about by an enormous calamity, will give concrete substance to international activity.
Jewish settlement in Palestine, which was embarked upon in order to enable the Jewish people to survive as a national entity, and which, in its social, economic and cultural aspects, constitutes an enterprise of universal significance, suffered from one basic error, which handicapped the development of its positive features. This basic error consisted in the tribute paid by political leadership to the traditional colonial policy, which was less suitable for Palestine than for any other region of the globe and certainly less fitting the Jewish people than any other nation. Hence, political leadership was guided by international and not intra-national considerations. Instead of relating the aims of the Jewish people to the geographical reality, wherein these aims had to be realised, the political leaders saw these aims only against the background of international events and in their relation to international problems. Thus, Palestine was embedded into international entanglements and attempts towards their solution, isolating it from the organic context of the Middle East, into the awakening of which it should have been integrated in accordance with a broader spiritual and social perspective.
Whoever pointed to this state of affairs as constituting a decisive factor in the shaping of the future, had to realise that the Zionist public and their leaders were, in this respect, blind to reality. This blindness was bound to prove fatal. To a large extent, this attitude and its practical consequences are responsible for the fact that the self-confidence and desire for self-determination prevailing among the Arab population of Palestine have found a militant form of expression.
At a time when colonial powers are forced into the defensive and have to give up position after position, even a nation with big-power backing could dare to settle in a country the population of which is maturing politically, only if it were sincerely bent on creating a real community of interest with that population; if it were prepared, at the price of inevitable sacrifices, to make the development of the country a joint concern; if it would enable the partner to co-operate actively in the enterprise and make him share the advantages gained. This applies in a still greater measure to a nation which cannot count on big-power support and which has to be careful not to mistake what is only the ephemeral interest of this or that big power, for genuine backing. What was needed at the outset of the settlement enterprise — in any case at the initiation of the modern one, undertaken with an international perspective — was a clearly defined programme of “do ut des” (give and take). Such a programme should have provided for the collective integration of the backward Arab population, as a whole, into Jewish economic activities and should have secured, in exchange, the indispensable demands necessary for the survival of the Jewish people as a national entity: free immigration, free acquisition of land, and the right of self-determination. What was actually put into practice, even when it seemed to answer real necessity, as was the case with the principle of ‘Jewish Labour’ [i.e. the principle that all hired labourers, both in industry and agriculture, should be exclusively Jews] was bound to have results almost contrary to the above programme. In these circumstances, those in the Arab camp, who wanted to shape the awakening Arab national movement in a negative, defensive manner, instead of allowing it to develop positive and social features, which would have threatened their interests, had an easy task.
In this faulty development of the Arab movement, as well as in our own, another characteristic feature of our age becomes dreadeningly apparent: the hypertrophy of political factors as compared to economic and cultural ones. This world of ours should, by dint of gigantic problems, be forced to bury phraseology and give way to matter-of-fact reality. Such a state of affairs should make politics only the facade of the economic and cultural structure. This facade has only to represent the economic and cultural structure, and not to exercise an influence impairing it. But instead of contenting itself with this role, the political principle claims to be the only decisive and active one. Hence, whenever real, that is, essentially economic clashes of interests between two nations occur, it is not the actual extent of the divergences, which determines the struggle, but the exaggerated and over-emphasised political aspect of these divergences. Nurtured by fictitious political ideas, this surplus factor has become more powerful in the public arena than economic realities themselves, since in any emergency, these economic factors cannot act but through their political agents, and, therefore, have to put up with and pay for the latter’s encroachments. Whilst the real conflicts might be easily solved, political fictions precipitate the crisis, by adding the emotional surplus; the crisis, in turn, increases the power of professional politicians. Such is the vicious circle.
It is frequently claimed that power lies with captains of industry, but this would only be true in unaffected conditions. More often than not are conditions affected by the mass intoxication with fictions, without which, it seems, most people can no longer go on in this dreadfully complicated world. In between come the catastrophes, that is, the time when the fictions become reality, because they were allowed to reign supreme. The power of professional politicians over the intoxicated masses is almost unlimited, although in the hour of catastrophe they have to share this power with military or gang leaders, unless they manage to unite both these functions — as, for instance, by holding one post officially and fulfilling the other function de facto, only. The “Jewish-Arab Question” has indeed become a classical example for all this.
What are we to call the Cassandra of our time? Whether we choose the proud name of “spiritual elite” or the somewhat contemptuous reference to “certain intellectuals”, it comes to the same. I am referring to those, who, equally free from the megalomania of the leaders and from the giddiness of the masses, discern the approaching catastrophe. They do not merely utter their warnings, but they try to point to the path which has to be followed if catastrophe is to be averted. This path is not unalterably defined. With history slipping further down the dangerous slope, they have to change the plan and adapt it to the remaining possibilities. They do not prattle about the goal, they want to attain it. Thus, they have to analyse reality in its changes, brought about by the suggestive interplay of political fictions, in order to arrive at a correct appreciation of facts, in order to reach their target eventually. Since they are out to realise these aims in fact and since they refuse to accept hopeless, heroic gestures as a substitute for the triumph of the national rescue work over immense obstacles, they are called defeatists. Because they remain faithful to the ideal and do not allow its replacement by the Asmodaeus of a political chimera, they are looked upon as quislings. Because, day and night, they summon up all inner forces so as not to submit to despair, and because they invoke the helpful power of reason, they are described as men whose hearts are left cold by the misery of their people.
Such are the convictions and such the fate of the group of men in whose midst IHUD and BA’AYOTH came into being.
Does this Cassandra act? She, too, only speaks. She does not act because she is not authorised to do so and because at this juncture action without authorisation would be madness. But her speeches are as many deeds — because they point to the path. The history of the present and the coming generations will prove that her speech was action and the road indicated, the only one leading to Jewish revival in Palestine.
We describe our programme as that of a bi-national state — that is, we aim at a social structure based on the reality of two peoples living together. The foundations of this structure cannot be the traditional ones of majority and minority, but must be different We do not mean just any bi-national state, but this particular one, with its particular conditions, i.e., a bi-national state which embodies in its basic principles a Magna Charta Reservationum, the indispensable postulate of the rescue of the Jewish people. This is what we need and not a “Jewish State’’; for any national state in vast hostile surroundings would mean premeditated national suicide, and an unstable international basis can never make up for the missing intra-national one. But this programme is only a temporary adaptation of our path to the concrete, historical situation — it is not necessarily the path itself. The road to be pursued is that of an agreement between the two nations — naturally also taking into account the productive participation of smaller national groups — an agreement which, in our opinion, would lead to Jewish-Arab cooperation in the revival of the Middle East, with the Jewish partner concentrated in a strong settlement in Palestine. This co-operation though necessarily starting out from economic premises, will allow development in accordance with an all-embracing cultural perspective and on the basis of a feeling of at-oneness, tending to result in a new form of society.
Essential pre-requisites for such an agreement are the two principles, which I have described as decisive for the immediate future of mankind: the precedence of economics over politics; and that of the intra-national principle over the international one.
The cleansing of the Jewish-Arab atmosphere is much more difficult today than it was only a few years ago. Above all, this is the result of an entirely fictitious programme, which does not comprise any possibility of realisation, and which relinquishes the realistic Zionism of toil and reconstruction — the Biltmore Programme [1]. This programme, interpreted as admitting the aim of a minority to “conquer” the country by means of international manoeuvres, has not only aroused Arab anger against official Zionism, but also made all attempts at bringing about Jewish-Arab understanding suspicious in the eyes of Arabs, who imagined that these attempts were concealing the officially admitted real intentions. Yet, even today, such a cleansing of the atmosphere — an indispensable preliminary condition for the establishment of agreement — is not impossible. This can only be done, however, on the basis of the primacy of reality. It is necessary to create conditions which will prove that the common interests now overshadowed by political considerations, are more real, more vital than the differences hitherto so successfully emphasised by the professional politicians on either side. This is what J.L. Magnes [2], when giving evidence before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, defined as reaching agreement “through life and not through discussion”. The realities of life should be given a chance to force the walls of political fictions. Magnes was right in going as far as to hope for an "agreement among the political leaders" themselves. Life, when given a chance, will prove strong enough to force a new line of action upon the politicians. The evil does not lie with politics as such, but with its hypertrophy.
Equally important for the intended agreement is the precedence of the intra-national principle over the international one. Prevailing Zionist policy hitherto adhered to the axiomatic view that international agreement had to precede, nay, determine the intra-national agreement with the Arabs. It is imperative to reverse this order: it is essential to arrive at an intra-national agreement, which is later to receive international sanction. This order will recommend itself also to the Arabs, even if today their political leaders refuse to admit it, because the Palestinian State they aim at will, in the present international situation, only come about if demanded jointly by Jews and Arabs — that is, only after Jewish-Arab agreement will have been established.
In the present state of world politics, the intra-national principle tends more and more to assume a constructive role, whilst it remains for the international principle only to sanction the results of the former. In other words: as a consequence of agreements between nations, super-national structures will of necessity come into being, based, from without, upon common economic interests and joint economic action, and cemented inwardly by the singleness of purpose in the cultural and social domains. Within this common concern of two or more nations, economically unified and culturally diverse, the political activities will partly be the joint action of all and partly the result of the separate action of each group; but all this diversity of effort will be moulded into a whole, by a great vision, shared by all and creative. Finally, these new social structures will be fitted into a super-territorial pattern, corresponding with our present “international” principle, but more vital and more active.
In the Middle East, no such larger integration will come about without a genuine agreement between Jews and Arabs and its international sanctioning. In the same manner, the essential Jewish demands can only be realised by way of such an agreement. Only if the Jews are able to offer the world the peace of the Middle East — as far as this depends upon them — will the world concede those demands to Jewry. For, one thing is certain: not only this or that Great Power needs a peaceful Middle East, but the nations of the world at large.
Since we embarked upon our struggle against fictitious political thinking, the power of these fictions over the Yishuv [3] has, it seems, been increasing continuously. First, a programme was drawn up that could not be realised by political means; when this became apparent a desperate and foolhardy section of Jewish youth resorted to violence — which is more vain still. The whole history of national movements, in which revolutionary and violent measures play no small part, was invoked to serve as a lesson that was no lesson — for it is evident that lessons drawn from history can only be applied if the particular character of the situation has been recognised: the weight of the interested powers, assessed, and the inter-play of forces between and within these states, as they affect the particular problem analysed. But this very investigation — an essential preliminary — was not undertaken; had it been, it would have laid bare the absurdity of a policy of violence in our situation.
It should of course, be borne in mind that genuine despair was prevailing, brought on by an action of extermination never before experienced by any other nation, as well as by the indifference of the world in the face of this action. Yet, despair does not usually render judgment more keen; rather does it lead to an intoxication by political fictions. Professional politicians here, as elsewhere, have made all the despair, all the misery of the nation, the demand for rescue, so many factors in their calculation. It is not the calculation that matters, however, it is reality; and the politicians of the world power most interested, instead of watching reality, had their eyes pinned on to these calculations. By so doing, they heightened the feeling of despair, especially since after an action of extermination of this kind, the poor human soul is inclined to see extermination lurking everywhere.
Nevertheless, the feeling continues to spread over the Yishuv that something is wrong with official Zionist policy; that irretrievable opportunities have been lost. The number of those, who re-examine their position, is growing. Our pains-taking efforts have not remained without result. It is now of the utmost importance to prevent this disillusionment from developing into destructive pessimism and to shape it into constructive resolution. More emphatically than ever has it to be shown that a solution is still possible. To bring this solution about will be more difficult and less satisfactory now, than at any earlier stage, but its realisation is still within our reach: it will bring us back to our path of constructive work.
To point to the way and to aim at the solution in the present and more difficult conditions is a task which can only be fulfilled by dint of a supreme effort. To this end, we seek allies everywhere and appeal for their support.
Notes
[1] The Biltmore Programme, established during the Biltmore Conference (New York City) in May 1942, called for the creation of a Jewish Commonwealth (i.e. a Jewish Nation State) in Palestine and demanded unrestricted Jewish immigration to the region.
[2] J.L. Magnes (1877-1948) was a Reformed Rabbi and a leader in the pacifist movement during World War I. He served as the first Chancellor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1925) and later as its President (1935-1948). He was a strong advocate of a binational Jewish-Arab State in Palestine.
[3] Yishuv is a Hebrew term meaning "settlement," referring to the Jewish community living in Palestine before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. It is often divided into the Old Yishuv, which consisted of religious Jews, and the New Yishuv, which included those influenced by the Zionist ideology.