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[2010] Carl Watner,
The Territorial Assumption: Rationale for Conquest
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 22
From the conclusion:
"As we know, most people in the world today have been acculturated to take the state for granted, and they, at most, seek to limit the state within the confines of national boundaries. Most people have never thought about the fact that taxation is theft, nor have they ever questioned the legitimacy of state boundaries. Most of our contemporaries simply assume that the state must exist, “and accept grudgingly or willingly, the enormous impact it has on [their] lives.” Nevertheless, there are still those few siren voices that call the nation-state into question and claim that we can live without it. Some of those people are libertarians, and it is they who identify the territorial assumption as a rationale for conquest."
Source: http://mises.org/journals/jls/22_1/22_1_12.pdf
[February 2010] Jurgen Brauer and Robert Haywood,
Non-state Sovereign Entrepreneurs and Non-territorial Sovereign Organizations
Abstract
We propose two new concepts, of non-state sovereign entrepreneurs and the nonterritorial sovereign organizations they form, and relate them to issues pertaining to state sovereignty, governance failures, and violent social conflict over the appropriation
of the powers that accrue to states in modern international law. The concepts deal with the rise of transboundary non-state actors, as they impinge on and aim to supplement or supersede certain powers of state actors. We provide examples to show that non-state sovereign entrepreneurs and their organizations already exist. We are interested in their potential role in conflict transformation.
Source: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2010/en_GB/wp2010-09/_files/82967192285675604/default/2010-09.pdf
[December 2008] Sherrill Stroschein,
Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applications of Dispersed State Control, Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 4, December 2008, pp. 655-74.
Abstract
In this article, I make a case for a dispersed state control model as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchical principles of the Weberian state. Rather than allocating governance powers in terms of territory, dispersed state controls are based on a functional principle, in which governance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or function. This examination is informed by recent debates in international relations theory on contractual and imperial network models of control, as well as work on non-territorial autonomy in the fields of nationalism and ethnic conflict. I examine the practical application of a dispersed control model in the context of the governance structure proposed for Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. I conclude with an overview of the advantages of creative designs for states that move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal with complex demographic and governing realities in regions such as the Balkans.
Source: http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/0/8/2/pages180825/p180825-1.php
[November 2009] Pál Nyíri
Extraterritoriality, Foreign Concessions: the Past and Future of a Form of Shared Sovereignty
A current look at extraterritoriality as implemented by the Chinese in Asia and in Africa. The author still seems unaware of the larger view of extraterritoriality beyond the state.
Source: http://www.espacestemps.net/document7952.html
[2005] Andreas P. Kyriacou
Functional, Overlapping, Competing, Jurisdictions and Ethnic Conflict Management
Abstract
By allowing ethnic groups to organize areas important to them regardless of their geographic distribution, functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ) have an important role to play in the management of ethnic conflict in plural societies.
The application of FOCJ to the area of ethnic conflict management calls for institutional structures which take into account possible problems stemming from the existence of economies of scale in the production of some public goods, the need to maintain ‘competitive equality’ among jurisdictions and the danger that the functional devolution which is inherent to FOCJ may harden group boundaries over time.
Source: www.dur.ac.uk/john.ashworth/EPCS/Papers/Kyriacou.pdf
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